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Abstract
The objective of this study is to identify the impact of specific corporate social responsibility 
behaviors on equity prices. This study uses fixed effect parametric and nonparametric 
regressions to quantify the effect of specific corporate social responsibility activities on the 
equity price multiples of a number of US firms from 1999 to 2009. The results of these empirical 
models consistently show that CEO diversity, corporate charitable giving, and work-life balance 
benefit plans, are associated with lower equity price multiples compared against similar firms 
that lack these characteristics. Additionally, board diversity and support of the LBGTQ 
community is associated with a positive impact on equity price multiples. This study provides 
evidence that individual corporate social responsibility activities can have drastic impacts on 
equity prices, leading the way for future research testing whether the magnitudes of these 
impacts are rational and in-line with their expected impact on financial performance and risk, or 
a deviation from the efficient market hypothesis.
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Introduction
Impact investing is a movement whereby investors actively seek to purchase securities of 
companies that act in a responsible manner with regard to some social issue, and avoid securities 
of firms who are irresponsible. The term corporate social responsibility refers to a broad range of 
topics but can generally be described using three major categories: environmental impact, social 
responsibility, and corporate governance; these are often referred to as ESG factors. A firm that 
is polluting an important tributary, paying their workers ‘unfairly’, does not contain a diverse 
board of directors, or participates in a sin-industry, will be considered to have a low corporate 
social responsibility score, and thus may be actively avoided by an impact investor. A recent 
example of this active avoidance would be the “divestment” campaign that recently spread 
across college campuses in North America. Students protested their universities’ endowment 
funds involvement in the fossil fuel industry, putting pressure on the endowment funds to sell 
their holdings in fossil fuel companies. From 2011 to 2016, this movement grew from causing 
six universities to divest from fossil fuel investments to 16% of all educational institutions in the 
US (Fossil Free 2015; Arabella Advisors 2016). Another instance of public outcry over firms 
acting “irresponsibly” is due to recent federal regulations that require public firms to publish 
their CEO’s salary as a multiple of their median-employee’s wage (Anderson 2018). The more 
disproportionate executive compensation is compared to the common employee the more the 
firm is seen as contributing to income and wealth inequality, and would therefore be avoided by 
impact investors. Alternatively, a firm who pays its employees a living-wage, is active in 
voluntary environmental cleanup programs, or participates in an affirmative action-like hiring 
system may be seen as more socially responsible, and thus gain the attraction of impact 
investors. By incorporating ESG factors into the investment decision, which traditionally only 
focuses on financial information and shuns emotion, the impact investing movement provides a 
link for social concerns which are unrelated to financial performance or risk to impact equity 
valuations.
With the increasing prevalence of impact investing and other similar movements where 
investors’ portfolio choice is affected by the social impact of the firms, it begs the question of 
what impact this movement has on equity valuations. If there is some penalty for acting
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irresponsibly, or a reward for acting responsibly, then this would encourage firms to act in the 
way that investors desire them to, and this would in effect be internalizing externalities while 
simultaneously diverging from the efficient market hypothesis. For example, if  a firm is using 
slave labor to acquire blood diamonds, and their stock became unpopular solely due to investors 
derision and avoidance of the stock, this would raise the firms cost of capital - limiting the 
amount of capital and labor available to the firm and moving them down to a lower isoquant.
This would in turn reduce the amount of slave labor and blood diamonds being produced and 
decreasing the amount of disutility created by these actions. This would then be a violation of the 
efficient market hypothesis as the firms’ stock price would be under-valued. The efficient market 
hypothesis states that a financial assets current price incorporates all publicly available 
information and is the best guess at its true intrinsic value. If social attitudes impact an investors 
willingness to pay for a financial asset without an impact on the perceived financial performance 
or risk of the asset, then the asset is not being valued according to its net present value of future 
cash flows - but instead by some utility function. This should not affect the valuation of the asset 
because if  the asset was under-valued (according to its net present value of future cash flows) 
then arbitrage by investors outside of the impact investing movement is possible.
This study aims to quantify the impact of specific CSR behaviors on equity prices and ascertain 
whether this corrective action is being taken. This study will be analyzing the impact of CEO and 
Board diversity, the employment of disabled persons, corporate charitable giving, work-life 
balance benefit plans, and support of the LGBTQ community. So far, most research on CSR’s 
impact on equity prices has been done using aggregate measures; this research will be the first to 
quantify the impact of specific individual characteristics after controlling for financial 
performance and risk using general-additive-models.
Literature Review
While the literature on corporate social responsibility, impact investing, etc, is broad, little 
research has been conducted which examines the impact of specific behaviors or actions or 
divergences from the efficient market hypothesis. Instead, most research focuses on the impact 
of CSR with regard to aggregate metrics, and the closest the research gets to answering question 
of CSR’s impact on equity prices is an investigation of the cost of capital which is thought to be
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explained by various effects of CSR on firm financial performance and risk. In addition to the 
effects of CSR on the cost of capital, firm risk and financial performance, the existing literature 
also gives insights into institutional investor’s asset selection with regard to CSR, asymmetry of 
information, index tracking and the opportunity cost of CSR portfolios. Additionally, it is 
important to review Fama (1970)’s seminal paper, Efficient Capital Markets. The literature on 
the impact of CEO and board member diversity is also quite numerous.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis
Fama (1970) describes capital markets as being efficient when “at any point fully reflect 
available information.” Within this theory of capital market efficiency, there are three variations, 
weak form, semi-strong form, and strong form. Weak form efficiency implies that market prices 
are reflective of all market information and therefore past returns have no impact on future 
returns. Semi-strong form efficiency implies that all publicly available information is accounted 
for in the stock price and prices will react to new information after it is released. This means that 
in the case of semi-strong form efficiency above-normal rates of return cannot be earned by 
trading with new information. Strong-form efficiency implies that all information, public and 
private, is accounted for in the price of the stock. This means that no investor may profit above 
the average investor when given new information.
Tests of weak-form efficiency include tests of return independence that is to test for auto­
correlation in the rates of return of various equities. Tests of semi-strong form efficiency include 
analyzing the effects of relevant events such as earnings releases or lawsuits on stock prices. 
Tests of strong form efficiency include testing whether insiders or exchange specialists can 
achieve super-normal returns, however since the SEC has regulation which forbids insider 
trading most it is not possible for them to legally achieve these returns. Exchange specialists 
however have been shown to be able to achieve super-normal returns with their non-public 
information such as unfilled limit orders. Fama concludes that the evidence in support of market 
efficiency is robust and extensive, while evidence to the contrary is, rather uniquely for 
economics, sparse.
Essentially, the EMH states that the price of a financial asset should be reflective of all available 
information - so if an impact investor were to have a higher willingness-to-pay for a specific
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asset because the underlying firm were responsible, any impact on the stock price should be bid- 
away by rational profit-seeking investors selling the then over-valued stock. If any of the 
variables discussed in this analysis that are uncorrelated to financial performance or risk, and 
only an effect on impact-investor utility, has a significant impact on equity prices then that would 
be a clear violation of the efficient market hypothesis.
Corporate Social Responsibility
Nofsinger and Sulaeman (2018) have researched how institutional investors weight their 
portfolios towards socially responsible firms. They find that institutional investors’ selection of 
responsible firms is not due to virtues or moral stances but instead due to the economic impact 
that the responsibility has on the firm’s securities. In one notable quote, the authors’ state that 
“companies with ES [environmental & social] concerns experience greater crash risk [i.e., lower 
ex-post return skewness] and have a higher likelihood of experiencing extreme negative events, 
such as bankruptcy filing and/or being delisted due to performance reasons from stock 
exchanges.” They also provide evidence that institutional portfolio weightings in high CSR firms 
follows the likelihood of these negative events. A given example is how institutional ownership 
in tobacco stocks began a downward trend when the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act [FSPTC] was moved favorably for amendment in the House of Representatives, a 
full year before the act was actually passed. This evidence supports the theory that institutions’ 
investments in corporate social responsibility is motivated by associated economic risk factors 
and not the virtues of being moral or socially responsible. Given these findings, any impact on 
price caused by a CSR variable should be looked at as not just being caused by investor moral 
sentiment but also due to associated risk factors.
Branch and Cai (2012) in an effort to examine whether an opportunity cost existed for investors 
in the impact investment movement they created index tracking portfolios with and without 
screening for CSR concerns. They found that investors could create portfolios of socially 
responsible stocks with statistically insignificant tracking errors. In other words, it is possible for 
an investor to replicate the performance of their index of choice, such as the S&P 500, while 
avoiding companies within the index with CSR concerns, without a statistically significant 
sacrifice to the accuracy of the index-tracking portfolio. This is an important finding because it
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means that at an aggregate level there is not a negative impact on portfolio performance for the 
socially responsible investor.
Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility on Corporate Financial Performance and Risk
Firms who are actively involved in the corporate social responsibility movement have several 
advantages over firms with a lower aggregate CSR scores. For example, firms who offer 
generous paternity leave, employee wellness programs, living wages, and strive for high levels of 
employee satisfaction in general, are much less likely to face a labor strike, which would hamper 
future profits, and see increased productivity of labor (Gubler, Larkin, and Pierce 2014). The 
same risk reduction effect can be seen when examining firms who take ethical stances on other 
issues such as, animal testing, child labor, carbon footprint, etc. As policy changes tend to follow 
social movements, firms who are taking these stances and avoiding the relevant activities make 
themselves unlikely to be litigated against for participating in said activities. This logic also 
applies to “sin industries” such as tobacco - investing in the oft litigated against tobacco industry 
would require one to calculate the probability and magnitude of potential lawsuits in order to 
arrive at an accurate share price. Decreasing participation in socially irresponsible behavior 
decreases the likelihood of facing future litigation and therefore increases the expected value of 
the firm. Thus, the cessation of activities that are counter to a CSR strategy is rewarded with 
enhanced shareholder value (Surroca, Tribo, and Waddock 2010; Cajias, Fuerst, and Bienert 
2014).
It has been hypothesized that managers who lead a firm into the realm of CSR are seen as more 
effective, forward thinking, better able to predict future economic conditions, etc. and therefore 
are better managers in general. Thus, CSR activity may signal a quality management team that 
may translate into financial stability and future financial success (Waddock and Graves 1997). 
This intertwining of social responsibility and a more classical valuation factor is a good example 
of what makes separating the effects of CSR and risk reduction on equity valuation so difficult.
The number of firms releasing a corporate social responsibility report is increasing in response to 
the impact investing movement. CSR reports commonly have information such as long-term 
plans to move to sustainable sourcing, reduce carbon emissions, move away from suppliers who 
utilize child labor, etc. This gives the investor additional information as to where the company is
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headed that otherwise might not be available, thus CSR reduces the information asymmetry 
between investors and firms that would exist in the absence of CSR activism, resulting in the 
reduction of stock volatility. There have been numerous empirical studies on this subject (Luo 
and Bhattacharya 2009; Lee and Faff 2009; Cajias, Fuerst, and Bienert 2014).
Most research concludes that CSR has a negative correlation with the cost of equity and cost of 
debt. That is to say that ceteris paribus firms whose actions align with the ethical priors of 
investors will have a lower cost of capital than a firm whose actions are morally opposed by the 
investor. This is mainly attributed to the above stated effects of CSR on the risk of the firms’ 
activities, quality of management, or reduction in information asymmetry. However, there exist a 
few studies that conflict with the general consensus and instead find a cost of capital premium on 
CSR activity, specifically Ghoul (2011). Cajias, Fuerst, and Bienert (2014) examined the effect 
of CSR on the cost of capital for specific industries and noted a “remarkable difference between 
consumer- and asset-oriented industries” . Their findings show that asset-oriented firms’ cost of 
capital are affected by CSR much more than consumer-oriented firms. They also found an 
increasing marginal effect of CSR on capital costs as capital costs increased. Meaning that risky 
firms with a high cost of capital have more to gain by undertaking a CSR agenda than lower risk 
firms with lower costs of capital.
Altruism
Very little research has been done on examining the effects of CSR after controlling for the 
effect CSR has on financial performance. Information availability, litigation risk, and other 
effects of CSR should be expected to have an effect on the expected value of the firm’s future 
earnings. Any residual effect on the cost of capital not explained by the effect of CSR on 
financial performance and risk must be due to a strictly behavioral phenomenon. If the effect that 
CSR has on the cost of capital is greater in a state populated by moral investors versus a state 
populated by purely risk-adjusted-yield seeking investors, then there exists some residual effect 
explained only by altruism. Dupre, Girerd-Potin, and Kassoua (2003) have indirectly studied this 
altruistic effect. They constructed Markowitz efficient frontiers of two portfolios using the same 
pool of stocks, one constructed without regard to social performance and another that was made 
from stocks that had been screened for social performance by removing low CSR companies 
such as tobacco and firearm producers [negative screening]. The results showed that the socially
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minded efficient frontiers had lower expected returns than for a given level of risk than the 
purely financial minded portfolio. This result indicates that the CSR oriented portfolio makers 
are willing to take a reduction in the expected return of their investments in exchange for the 
utility obtained from being socially responsible. This study however focused at the portfolio 
level so it is uncertain whether the relative inefficiency of CSR portfolios is caused by higher 
covariance’s of high CSR firms, higher risk of high CSR firms, or lower cost of equity of CSR 
firms. Their study also relies on the assumptions of the Markowitz’s theory, such as a normal 
distribution of returns and the assumption that historical returns can predict future returns, which 
are not representative of reality and hence their methodology of portfolio construction may not 
be representative of real investor behavior. However, taken at face value the results state that 
CSR minded investors are taking a lower risk-adjusted rate of return in order to maintain a 
socially minded portfolio -  pointing towards altruism in return for utility.
Literature on Specific Topics 
CEO Diversity
Most research on CEO diversity centers on the glass ceiling, the seemingly impenetrable barrier 
that keeps women from achieving the position of chief executive officer in publicly owned firms. 
Most theories as to this phenomenon are based on unobservable ceteris paribus differences in 
perceptions of performance. Wolfers (2006) examined stock returns and found that female 
CEO’s did not have statistically different returns than their male counterparts. Grossman et al. 
(2016) examined the perceived leadership ability of men and women after controlling for various 
gender differences such as attractiveness and found that women are perceived to be less effective 
leaders than their male counterparts are. This research points for any impact on equity valuations 
due to CEO diversity to be due to perceived differences in ability of the chief executive.
Less research has been conducted examining the impact of non-gender CEO diversity.
Board Diversity
Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) found that board gender diversity improves stock price 
informativeness. Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that female board members have better 
attendance than male board members, and male board members have fewer attendance issues
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when they have female counterparts on the board. Despite this positive influence given by the 
female board members, the effect on firm performance is negative due to companies with fewer 
takeover defenses. Rose (2007) examined the impact of female board representation and firm 
performance and found no significant link between them using a sample of Danish firms between 
1998 and 2001. While it is clear and obvious that a well-functioning board of directors would 
lead to a better functioning corporation, the link between board diversity and firm performance is 
muddled, and therefore so is the link between board diversity and equity valuation.
Less research has been conducted examining the impact of non-gender board diversity.
Employment of Disabled Persons
Little research has been conducted examining the impact of the employment of disabled persons 
on firm performance and equity prices. Possible theories as to the impact may include: marketing 
power, reduction of litigation risk (Nofsinger and Sulaeman, 2018), improved corporate 
reputation, etc.
Corporate Charitable Giving
Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan (2010) found that corporate charitable giving, under certain 
circumstances, may actually increase firm revenues. This action is dependent on customers’ 
perception regarding philanthropy, and customer satisfaction’s sensitivity to philanthropy. Given 
these findings, research wishing to establish proof of a violation of the efficient market 
hypothesis would need to note the distinguishment between an increase in equity valuation due 
to charitable giving, and an increase in expected revenues given customer sentiment to the brand 
due to the charitable giving.
Work-life Balance
Beauregard and Henry (2009) examined the effects of work-life balance on performance and 
found that there was actually a negative relationship, providing employees with positive work- 
life balance benefits actually hurts performance. It is important to note that Beauregard and 
Henry (2009)’s result does not dispute the claim that work-life balance may attract better 
applicants and therefore increase firm value.
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LGBTQ Support
Pichler et al. (2017) examined the impact of LGBTQ support and found that it is positively 
correlated to firm performance due to the firm being seen as an employer of choice. Less- 
researched but obviously important is the relationship to LGBTQ support and litigation risk, and 
the greater quality of life given to employees which may then be turned into an increase in 
productivity, though this is disputed by Beauregard and Henry (2009).
Empirical Model
In similar literature quantifying financial performance, model specifications include the variables 
of interest and controls for performance or growth, volatility or risk, firm size, capital structure, 
solvency, and variables to control for heterogeneity such as sector and industry or dividend 
policy. Given this precedent, the models in this analysis includes indicator variables for the 
behaviors of interest, controls for capital structure, growth, size, risk, and sector in order to test 
the hypothesis that these variables of interest are affecting equity valuations.
Dependent Variables
Nominal stock prices are essentially meaningless. One stock valued at $1,000 a share says 
nothing about the comparison to another stock valued at $2,000 a share, the simplest explanation 
would be the number of shares outstanding are almost guaranteed to be different. For this reason, 
nominal prices are not an ideal dependent variable. Instead, this analysis uses prices that are 
normalized by dividing by various accounting metrics - these models will still be testing for the 
existence of a multiplicative altruistic premium or discount - only the other covariates beta 
estimates will have more meaning and lower standard errors. The dependent variables used in 
this analysis will be price to earnings ratio, price to book ratio, and price to sales ratio. It is 
important to note the pros, cons, and assumptions underlying each of these variables. Price to 
earnings ratio is asymptotic at zero with respect to earnings. As earnings are positive and 
approach zero the price to earnings ratio will approach positive infinity. As earnings are negative 
and approach zero the PE ratio approaches negative infinity. At earnings of zero the price to 
earnings ratio is undefined. This proposes a challenge of how to adjust these numbers to make a 
regression analysis meaningful if  it were to be run in levels. However, when running the
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dependent variable as a logarithm, observations are lost due to the PE ratio being negative for a 
number of firms at various points in time. The price to book ratio is easy to understand, however 
different types of firms of similar size will often have drastically different book values. For 
example, a consulting firm is likely to have a much lower book value than a manufacturing firm 
is because they do not require nearly as much capital investment and instead rely on labor. Price 
to sales ratio is similar to price to earnings except that it will not have missing observations due 
to logging negatives because revenues of course cannot be negative. Additionally, different types 
of firms will have differing price to sales ratios because they have other sources of income.
Firms in the financial sector for example would be expected to have high price to sales ratios as a 
major source of income would be interest revenues, which is not included in sales. Each of these 
variables have their own limitations, but each will be able to give insights into whether or not 
equities are being traded with a multiplicative premium or discount due to specific CSR 
behaviors.
The following equation defines the dependent variables:
Equation (1)
where Z is equal to Earnings, Assets, or Price depending on the model, and CashFlowit 
and rit are implicit.
Independent Variables
The independent variables used in these models will consist of measures of financial 
performance, capital structure, and risk to act as controls, as well as indicator variables for 
specific CSR behaviors. CapitalStructure is the total debt to equity; the higher this number the 
more of the firm’s profits are pegged to go to bond holders, the expected sign of this covariate is 
negative. Growth is the trailing 12-month growth rate of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization will capture the effect of estimated growth rates, the expected 
sign of this covariate is positive. DiscountRate is the cost of equity - the discount rate applied to 
the firms’ future cash flows for equity holders, the expected sign of this covariate is negative.
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The variable Sector is a factor variable indicating the sector that the firm belongs in, such as 
Consumer Non-durable Goods, Energy, etc. Size is the number of employees within the firm, this 
measure of size is less common than market capitalization, total assets, or total revenues, but 
these variables would cause an endogeneity problem as they are each found within the definition 
of the dependent variables. Figure 1 shows the direct relationship between firm revenues and 
number of employees. Year is a factor variable, allowing the dependent variables to fluctuate 
over time with macro level events not captured in the other variables.
The selected CSR variables of interest are ceodiv, boarddiv, empdisabled, charity, worklife, and 
lgbtq. These variables indicate whether or not a woman or other minority is at the position of 
CEO, the board of directors contains one or more women or other minorities, whether or not the 
firm has a noticeable proportion of disabled employees, the firm donates more than 1.5% of 
earnings to charity, whether the firm offers a positive work-life balance benefit package, and 
whether the firm is notable for its support of the LGBTQ community. These variables were 
chosen because from a social perspective they are unambiguously “good”, meaning that any 
unqualified statement opposing these distinctions or behaviors would likely be seen by the 
majority of people as politically incorrect. All of these CSR variables would therefore be 
desirable to a member of the impact investing movement, and therefore the firm’s equity should 
be more desirable.
Data
Data was obtained from two sources, Bloomberg and KLD Stats. Bloomberg provided data for 
the control variables and KLD Stats provided the data regarding CSR characteristics. The data 
used in the analysis consists of all US public equities where data was available for all of the 
selected variables of interest; therefore, the full list of securities available from either source is 
dramatically reduced due to missingness.
No data is available for firms that are no longer in business or were absorbed, or otherwise no 
longer exist in their previous form; therefore, our data is subject to survivorship bias. Figure 2 
shows the data distribution of the unbalanced panel dataset of various companies from 1999 to 
2009, notice the missingness in early years and the general lack of missingness in the later years 
which will cause survivorship bias. The missingness in the year 2009 is not due to defunct
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businesses, but due to simple missing data points causing some observations to be dropped in 
that year.
All continuous variables were centered and scaled to have mean zero and unit variance in order 
to reduce computational complexity. The impact of this is that the continuous control variables 
have a different interpretation, instead being in terms of standard deviations. However, since this 
analysis focuses on the CSR indicator variables that are unchanged, the interpretation of these 
variables remain simple changes to the intercept of the regression lines and may be interpreted as 
percentage changes to the dependent variable due to the log-level form.
As seen in Table 1, the CSR activity of interest that least frequently occurs is the employment of 
disabled persons, with an occurrence of only 2.9%. Still, given our large sample size of 4703 in 
our lowest sample model, this indicator occurs 136 times. There should be little worry that this 
dataset is too small to conduct this analysis. The CSR activity that occurs most frequently is 
LGBTQ support, which occurs in 18.1% of observations, or 851 observations out of 4703 in our 
smallest model.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of observations within the various sectors. As mentioned with the 
CSR variables, there are clearly enough observations of each factor level to have a meaningful 
regression analysis.
Model Specification
Hausman tests indicate that the individual-specific effects are correlated with the independent 
variables, and therefore random effect regressions would be inconsistent. Therefore, fixed effect 
regressions are appropriate.
The fixed effects parametric model is shown below:
Equation (2).
Yitz = Poz + Pz* CSRit + ^ z * C on tro ls + e
where Yitz is the zth dependent variable for firm i at time t and all pz and ipz are vectors
of regression coefficients associated with CSRit and C ontrolit, vectors of CSR indicator 
variables and controls for financial risk and performance of the ith firm at time t.
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The fixed effects general additive model is shown below:
Equation (3)
Yitz = Poz + P z *  CSRit + Yz * C ontrolit + e
where Yitz is the zth dependent variable for firm i at time t and all fiz is a vector of 
regression coefficients associated with CSRit, a vector of CSR indicator variables, and yz is a 
vector of smooth terms fitted by splines associated with C ontrolit, a vector of controls for 
financial risk and performance of the ith firm at time t.
General-additive-models1 are especially useful for this fixed effects regression because the 
coefficient of interest is still as easily interpreted as it is in an OLS regression, but the GAM 
extracts more information from the data and allows for a higher R 2 and truer fit of the model to 
what is empirically observed. By allowing the continuous control variables to be fit with a spline, 
we eliminate the restriction that the theoretical relationship is empirically replicable with some 
2nd, 3rd, or nth degree polynomial, which is an unnecessary and unfounded assumption. By 
using splines instead of polynomials to fit the continuous control variables, the estimated 
regression lines fit closer to what is empirically observed - reducing the residuals and allowing 
the regression coefficients for the CSR indicator variables to be more accurate.
Empirical Analysis
In order to confidently state that a covariate has an impact on price, it should be consistent in 
sign and statistical significance across all three models, otherwise one cannot rule out the 
possibility that the covariate is influencing the divisor inside of the dependent variables. 
However, even if a covariate is only significant in one of the three models it still provides 
evidence that firms valuations are being impacted by the behavior associated with the covariate.
1 All general additive models were fit using the ‘mgcv’ R package:
Wood, S.N. (2011) Fast stable restricted maximum likelihood and marginal likelihood estimation 
of semiparametric generalized linear models. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (B)
73(1):3-36
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This is not a contradiction, a firm which participates in a specific CSR activity may not have a 
strict percentage premium or discount associated with it, but instead change the valuation 
methodology used to find the firms intrinsic value - such as changing the relative importance of 
assets and liquidation value compared to future cash flows represented better by an earnings or 
sales valuation multiple.
As all of the parametric models show evidence of auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity, as 
shown by the p-values of the diagnostic tests reported alongside the model results, all parametric 
models have been reported with Arellano standard errors that are robust in the presence of auto­
correlation and heteroscedasticity, Arellano (1987). Panel unit-root tests show no evidence o f 
non-stationarity within the data.
Parametric Models
As seen in Table 2 the parametric models on price to earnings ratio, price to sales ratio, and price 
to book ratio, had sample sizes of 4703, 5059, and 5120 respectively. The R 2’s these models 
were 0.52, 0.87, and 0.73 respectively. As seen in Figures 4, 6 and 8, the residuals of the price to 
earnings, price to sales, and price to book models follow an approximately normal distribution, 
and as shown in Figure 5, 7, and 9, the respective models variance of the residuals are mildly 
heteroskedastic.
CEO Diversity is statistically significant in the price to sales and price to book models. The 
estimated coefficients are -0.106 and -0.147, which when following the methodology of 
Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), translates into an impact of -10% and -13.6% respectively on a 
firm’s price to sales and price to book ratios for having a woman or other minority as their chief 
executive officer. The price to sales model result is statistically significant to the 10% level while 
the price to book ratio coefficient is significant to the 1% level. The price to earnings model did 
not have a significant result for this variable.
Board diversity was statistically significant in the price to earnings model to the 1% level. The 
estimated coefficient for this model was -0.098, which translates into an impact of -9.3% for 
having a diverse board o f directors. While this coefficient is practically large and is significant, 
the other two models were not significant. These results may be reflective of the mixed results 
found in the literature.
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The variable empdisabled is not statistically different from zero in any model. The minimum p- 
value for this variable was found in the price to book ratio model and had a value of 0.32.
Charitable giving was statistically significant in the price to sales and price to book models. The 
estimated coefficients of these models are -0.135 and -0.155, which translate into impacts of 
-12.6% and -14.4% on a firm’s price to sales and price to book ratios respectively. These results 
are statistically significant to the 1% level.
Work-life balance benefit plans are statistically significant in all three parametric models. The 
coefficients of these two models are -0.165, -0.245, and -0.126. These translate into a -15.2% 
change in price to earnings ratio, a -21.7% change in price to sales ratio, and -11.8% change in 
price to book ratio for firms indicated to have a strong work-life balance benefit plan. These 
results are all significant to the 1% level. Given these results, one can confidently say that work- 
life balance benefit plans have a statistically significant and practically large effect on the 
valuation of equities within this sample.
LGBTQ was not statistically significant in any of the three parametric models.
Non-Parametric Models
As seen in Table 3 the non-parametric models on price to earnings ratio, price to sales ratio, and 
price to book ratio, had N ’s of 4703, 5059, and 5120 respectively. The adjusted-ft2’s these 
models were 0.52, 0.88, and 0.74 respectively. Compared to the results of the parametric models, 
the results found in the non-parametric models are very similar. Standard deviations are slightly 
different when compared to the parametric models but statistical significance did not change 
between the two methods -  anything significant to the 10% level in the parametric models was 
also significant in the non-parametric models. The most noticeable difference in the methods 
when examining the indicator variables o f interest are that the coefficients are slightly different 
between the two methods (with rounding, differences do not occur at the thousandths place).
CEO Diversity is statistically significant in the price to sales and price to book models. The 
estimated coefficients are -0.106 and -0.147, which translates into an impact of -10% and -13.6% 
respectively on a firm’s price to sales and price to book ratios for having a woman or other 
minority as their chief executive officer. The price to sales model result is statistically significant
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to the 10% level while the price to book ratio coefficient is significant to the 1% level. The price 
to earnings model did not have a significant result for this variable.
Board diversity was statistically significant in the price to earnings model to the 1% level. The 
estimated coefficient for this model was -0.098, which translates into an impact of -9.3% for 
having a diverse board of directors. While this coefficient is practically large and is significant, 
the other two models were not significant. These results may be reflective of the mixed results 
found in the literature.
The variable empdisabled is not statistically different from zero in any model.
Charitable giving was statistically significant in the price to sales and price to book models. The 
estimated coefficients of these models are -0.135 and -0.155, which translate into impacts of 
-12.6% and -14.4% on a firm’s price to sales and price to book ratios respectively. These results 
are statistically significant to the 1% level.
Work-life balance benefit plans are statistically significant in all three parametric models. The 
coefficients of these two models are -0.165, -0.245, and -0.126. These translate into a -15.2% 
change in price to earnings ratio, a -21.7% change in price to sales ratio, and -11.8% change in 
price to book ratio for firms indicated to have a strong work-life balance benefit plan. These 
results are all significant to the 1% level. Given these results, one can confidently say that work- 
life balance benefit plans have a statistically significant and practically large effect on the 
valuation of equities within this sample.
LGBTQ was not statistically significant in any of the three parametric models.
Conclusions and Implications
The use of general additive models within this paper offer the same results as robust fixed effect 
regressions. The non-parametric models however offer a slightly higher R2 slightly different 
coefficients, and slightly better predictive power due to those changes.
The presence of a woman or other minority CEO is associated with lower stock prices after 
controlling for financial performance and risk. This may be due to a perception that women lack 
leadership or financial ability such as mentioned in the literature. However, it could also be due
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to uncontrolled heterogeneity. As these models only controlled for sector and not industry, if  
women or other minorities are more likely to be CEO’s of companies in industries that 
commonly have lower valuation multiples then this estimated impact would be overstated due to 
omitted-variable bias. An example of this situation could be; a women’s health product company 
being headed by a woman and women’s health companies having lower expected growth than 
comparable firms in the same sector. Further research could control for this heterogeneity and 
repeat the analysis or break down the variable further into two variables for women and 
minorities. Given these possibilities, one should hesitate when trying to apply causality to these 
results - future research is needed to state definitively that appointing a female or other minority 
CEO would be met with a lower equity valuation.
Board diversity is associated with a negative impact on price to earnings ratio models and a 
insignificant impact on price to sales and price to book ratio models. This inconsistency might 
alarm some; however, as the price to earnings ratio model is significant to the 5% level, it still 
may be that the true impact is positive or zero. Given the literatures mixed findings that board 
diversity improves firm reputation and CSR measures, increases board performance and 
attendance, but may reduce take-over defenses, these mixed results are not violating any 
theoretical assumptions.
The employment o f disabled persons is not statistically significant in any o f the parametric or 
non-parametric models. Given the lack of literature on this specific topic, one must rely on 
theory provided by labor economics. If firms pay their employees their marginal revenue 
product, the employment of a person disabled or not should have no impact on the firm’s 
financial well-being. Another explanation could be that any losses incurred because of paying 
labor more than their marginal products could be offset by the improved public opinion o f the 
firm and the marketing power that hiring a disabled labor force entails. Further research could 
expand this research to find explicit and implicit costs associated with employing disabled 
persons and the benefits that come with such employment, say positive consumer sentiment.
Corporate charitable giving is punished with lower price to sales and price to book ratios. The 
obvious theory for this result is that by donating cash flows, the firm is bypassing the opportunity 
to distribute those cash flows to shareholders and so the firm’s value is reduced. The fact that 
charitable giving was not significant in the price to earnings ratio model is also telling, as
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charitable donations up to 10% of the firms’ earnings are tax-deductible and therefore reduce the 
earnings of the firm. This result is not surprising and appears to support the efficient market 
hypothesis. Further research could use additional data on charitable giving, namely the dollar 
value, and test if  the impact on prices is proportional to the amount of donations. If the impact 
were negative and greater in magnitude than the amount of donations, then that would be 
evidence that investors are punishing the firm for its charitable behavior to cease it. If the impact 
on equity prices were positive, or negative but lower in magnitude than the level of donations 
then the efficient market hypothesis would not hold, as investors would be overpaying for the 
firm’s equity due to a reception of utility for the firms’ charitable behavior. In effect, the charity 
would be being passed from the investor to the firm and to the end recipient.
The magnitude of the impact on work-life balance benefit plans is extremely large. For these 
impacts to be rational, they would have to be proportional to the cost to the firm of these 
activities. For example, for a 13% reduction in a firm pricing multiple to be rational according to 
the efficient market hypothesis, it would have to be accompanied with a 13% reduction in cash 
flows, otherwise there may be some punishing effect - where investors are punishing the firm for 
wasteful spending to halt the behavior. However, due to the large impact on price to earnings and 
price to sales ratios, those impacts on earnings and sales are already accounted for. The 
remaining impact on the equity valuations must be due to associated higher risk or lower growth 
which accompany a work-life benefit plan. The sheer magnitude of these impacts necessitates 
further research. Further research could quantify this impact after measuring the expenses, 
revenues, risk, and growth, associated with the work-life benefit plans to test the hypothesis that 
the magnitude of this effect is rational and in-line with economic theory or a deviation from the 
efficient market hypothesis.
The non-significant impact on stock prices associated with corporate support of the LGBTQ 
movement may be explained with pointed rationality. The support of LGBTQ employees does 
not carry with it a decrease in litigation risk or attract employees which offer a higher value due 
to their being paid the marginal revenue product. Further research could, survey institutional and 
private investors regarding their beliefs of the impact of LGBTQ support on a firm’s litigation 
risk, quantify the costs associated with LGBTQ support, and testing if the estimated impact on
18
equity prices is rational according to the costs and perceived risk reduction associated with 
LGBTQ support.
While these results are promising and show that corporate social responsibility activity can 
influence a firm’s equity price, the impact investing movement is getting more popular and 
increasing in size as measured by assets under management as time goes on. The dataset used in 
this analysis only goes to 2009, leaving the most recent 9 years, where impact investing has been 
the most prevalent, unresearched by this analysis. It is likely that i f  this analysis were performed 
on a newer set of data one would find significant evidence of specific corporate social 
responsibility activity’s impact on equity pricing. The most important contribution that this paper 
has made is that it lays the groundwork for further research to quantify the costs and benefits 
accrued by firms participating in corporate social responsibility. By showing conclusively that 
corporate social responsibility actions have drastic impacts on equity valuations after controlling 
for performance and risk, the next step is to quantify i f  those impacts are rational, punishing 
management teams to halt the behavior, or an altruistic deviation from contemporary financial 
valuation methodologies due to the incorporation o f a social utility function into the investment 
decision. The impact investing movement provides a logical pathway for the third option to 
materialize.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Year 5.177 2,005-298 2.489 1,999 2,009
lnPE 4,703 3.002 0.729 -0 .8 4 9 7.748
In PS 5,059 0.367 1.166 -5 .0 9 9 9.962
I11PB 5.120 0.943 0.783 -3 .0 2 4 7.861
ceodiv 5.177 0.053 0.225 0 1
bourddiv
t-i—1iti. 0.107 0.310 0 1
empdisabled 5.177 0.020 0.169 0 1
chazity 5.177 0.032 0.176 0 1
worklife
t-i—1 0.089 0.285 0 1
lgbtq 5.177 0.181 0.385 0 1
Capita lStructure
t-i—1iti. -0 .0 0 0 1.000 -0 .0 6 5 67.237
Growth 5.177 -0 .0 0 0 1.000 -6 .1 1 9 45.630
Sales 5.177 0.000 1.000 -0 .3 3 2 20.185
Discount Rate
t-i—1lC 0.000 1.000 -7 .3 4 5 20.182
Size 5.177 -0 .0 0 0 1.000 -0 .2 5 4 23.357
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Table 2: Linear Regression Model Results
Dependent variable:
InPE InPS InPB
ceodiv 0.08 -0.106* -0.147***
(-0.066) (-0.059) (-0.057)
boarddiv -0.098*** -0.001 0.032
(-0.037) (-0.032) (-0.039)
empdisabled 0.01 -0.048 0.064
(-0.06) (-0.053) (-0.064)
charity -0.019 -0.135*** -0.155***
(-0.059) (-0.052) (-0.055)
worklife -0.165*** -0.245*** -0.126**
(-0.063) (-0.056) (-0.062)
lgbtq -0.022 -0.045 -0.008
(-0.038) (-0.034) (-0.033)
Capital Structure 0.005 -0.046 0.080***
(-0.003) (-0.049) (-0.027)
Growth -0.016 0.003 0.022**
(-0.016) (-0.008) (-0.011)
Discount Rate 0.002 -0.078*** -0.043***
(-0.018) (-0.017) (-0.013)
Size -0.124*** -0.168*** -0.185***
(-0.032) (-0.043) (-0.049)
Constant 2.526*** -1.086*** 0.249
(-0.291) (-0.154) (-0.188)
Observations 4,703 5,059 5,120
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.87 0.73
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Table 3: General Additive Model Results
Dependent variable:
InPE InPS InPB
ceodiv 0.08 -0.106* -0.147***
(-0.074) (-0.057) (-0.055)
boarddiv -0.098** -0.001 0.032
(-0.042) (-0.033) (-0.032)
empdisabled 0.01 -0.048 0.064
(-0.07) (-0.055) (-0.053)
charity -0.019 -0.135*** -0.155***
(-0.066) (-0.052) (-0.050)
worklife -0.165** -0.245*** -0.126**
(-0.066) (-0.052) (-0.050)
lgbtq -0.022 -0.045 -0.008
(-0.039) (-0.030) (-0.029)
Capital Structure 0.005 -0.046 0.080***
(-0.014) (-0.010) (-0.010)
Growth -0.016 0.003 0.022**
(-0.011) (-0.008) (-0.008)
Discount Rate 0.002 -0.078*** -0.043***
(-0.015) (-0.010) (-0.009)
Size -0.124*** -0.168*** -0.185***
(-0.040) (-0.032) (-0.031)
Constant 2.526*** -1.086*** 0.249
(-0.323) (-0.261) (-0.254)
Observations 4,703 5,059 5,120
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.88 0.74
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